We study a two-player zero-sum game in which one of the players is restricted to mixed strategies with limited randomness. More precisely, we consider the maximum payoff that the maximizer (Alice) can secure with limited randomness h. This problem finds an operational interpretation in the context of repeated games with non-ideal sources of randomness. The computational aspects of this problem has not received much attention in the game theory literature. We begin by observing the equivalence of this problem with entropy minimization problems in other scientific contexts. Next, we provide two explicit lower bounds on the entropy-payoff tradeoff curve. To do this, we provide and utilize new results for the set of distribution that guarantee a certain payoff for Alice (mixed strategies corresponding to a security level for Alice). In particular, we study how this set of distribution shrinks as we increase the security level. While the use of total variation distance is common in game theory, our derivation indicates the suitability of utilizing the Renyi-divergence of order two.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a two-player and zero-sum game between Alice and Bob. The game is played once. A Nash equilibrium assigns a strategy to Alice and Bob such that no player has any incentive to unilaterally change his strategy. It is proven that if the players can randomize on their pure strategies set according to any probability distribution, then the game has at least one Nash equilibrium in the randomized mixed strategies. However, assume that Alice has restrictions on implementing probability distributions when choosing his mixed strategy. More specifically, assume that Alice can only choose a mixed action with entropy at most a given number h. For instance, if h = 0, Alice is only allowed to play pure actions. We are interested in the maximum payoff that Alice can secure with mixed actions of entropy at most h (regardless of the action of Bob). Let us denote this by J(h). Equivalently, we may ask: in order to guarantee average payoff of w, how much randomness needs to be utilized by Alice? Let us denote the minimum entropy of the randomness consumed by Alice to guarantee payoff w by F (w). We may call F (w), the minentropy function 1 ; F (·) is the inverse function of J(·).
Even though J(h) is defined in a one-shot setting, the (upper concave envelope) of J(h) finds an operational meaning in [1] - [3] in the context of repeated games as the payoff that Alice can secure in the long run. For instance, Gossner and Vieille [1] study a repeated game in which Alice cannot randomize freely, but has access to an external i.i.d. source X 1 , X 2 , · · · which are revealed symbol by symbol (causally) to Alice as the game is played out. They show that the entropy of the source H(X) characterizes the payoff that Alice can secure in the long run, and the answer is given in terms of J(H(X)). In the full version of this paper in [4] , we give a simplified proof of the result of [1] (and also generalize it). Another motivation for J(h) is given in [5] , [6] , arguing that limitation on random strategies of players stems from simplicity of humans; that "humans are known to be bad at generating random-like sequences".
To compute F (w), one has to first consider the set of distributions on the action of Alice that would secure her a payoff w. This set will be a polytope in the space of all probability distributions. Then, one should solve an entropy minimization problem over this polytope. In fact, minimizing and maximizing entropy arises in a wide range of contexts. Computing maximum entropy under a set of linear constraints is a well-studied problem with a wide range of applications, e.g., see the principle of maximum entropy. It is shown in [7] that computing the minimum entropy can be also quite important. Furthermore, many algorithms for clustering and pattern recognition are essentially solving entropy minimization problems [8] . Another related problem is that of finding a joint probability distribution of minimum entropy, given its marginal distributions e.g., see [9] - [11] .
Entropy minimization is known to be an NP-hard nonconvex optimization problem [12] . Since the entropy is a concave function over the probability simplex, its minimum occurs at a vertex of the feasible domain. As a result, computation of F (w) leads to a search problem over an exponentially large set. Even though the algorithm of [13] can be used to compute F (w), but it has no guarantee of success.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We study the properties of F (w) and give a number of easy-to-compute bounds on the value of F (w). One of the bounds on F (w) is expressed in term of a linear program; this linear program has a quite general form. We prove the following explicit lower bound on F (w) for all w satisfying v ≤ w ≤ w * :
where m and m are the minimum and maximum entries of the entries of the payoff table; v is the payoff that Alice can guarantee with deterministic strategies (pure-strategy security level) and w * is the Nash value of the game for Alice (payoff that Alice can guarantee with no restriction on her action's entropy). Because the linear program we consider has a quite general form (and can be converted to other linear programs with a change of variables), this result can be of independent interest. • We give and utilize new results on the set of mixed strategies that guarantee a certain security level. While the literature on game theory makes extensive use of total variation distance between distributions, we propose and illustrate the use of the χ 2 -divergence (or the Tsallis divergence of order two) in game theoretic contexts. The χ 2 -divergence is defined as χ 2 (p, q) = i (p i − q i ) 2 /q i , where p = (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ) and q = (q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q n ) are two probability distributions. To see the applicability of this divergence measure, consider a zero-sum game between Alice and Bob. Fix an arbitrary (mixed) strategy for Bob. Let p 1 and p 2 be two probability distributions for the action of Alice. Let W 1 and W 2 denote the payoff of Alice when she plays according to p 1 and p 2 respectively. Then, E[W 1 ] and E[W 2 ] are the payoffs secured by p 1 and p 2 . Also Var[W 2 ] is a natural object, the risk associated to p 2 . Then, as we see later in Lemma 10, these natural objects in a game come together as follows:
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we define the problem and in Section IV we give our results. Some of the proofs can be found in Section V, while others are given in [4] .
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Consider a zero-sum game between players Alice (A) and
Bob (B) with respective pure strategy sets A = {1, . . . , n} and B = {1, . . . , n } where n and n are natural numbers. The payoff matrix is denoted by U = [u ij ] where u ij is the real valued payoff that player A gets from player B when i ∈ A and j ∈ B are played. Throughout, by game U, we mean a game with payoff table U. Player A (B) wishes to maximize (minimize) the expected payoff. The set of all randomized strategies of players A and B are denoted by Δ(A) and Δ(B) respectively which are probability simplexes on sample spaces A and B respectively. Thus, Alice's strategy corresponds to a probability mass function (pmf) p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ), which can be understood as a column vector. The payoff of Alice if Bob plays j ∈ B is i p i u ij . Thus, the set of all distributions that guarantee payoff w for Alice can be expressed as
where p T is the transpose of the column vector p, 1 is a column vector of all ones and v 1 ≥ v 2 means v 1 is elementwise greater than or equal to v 2 . We define
where H(p) is the Shannon entropy of p in bits. If w is bigger than w * (the Nash value of Alice), the feasible set of optimization problem in 2 is empty and we set F U (w) = +∞.
Since v is the payoff that is secured without consumption of
It is immediate from the definition P U (w) that this set is decreasing in w, i.e., for any w 1 ≥ w 2 ,
We are interested to see if the inclusion in (3) is strict, and if yes, quantify to what extent it is. To do this, we look at the distance between the set P U (w 1 ) and the compliment of Figure 1 . The distance between any two sets can be defined as
where d(p, q) can be any arbitrary distance measure. The standard option is the total variational distance d 1 (p, q) = 1 2 i |p i − q i |. We then have:
Observe that the quantities m and m can be simply computed from U. The idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is standard (e.g., see [1, eq. (4) ] for a similar derivation) and can be found in [4] .
In this paper, we propose use of the Rényi divergence of order two between p and q to quantify the distance between two distributions: 3 q) ).
Our first result gives the following bound:
The idea of the proof can be found in Section V-A. The above result is derived by a probabilistic approach, which we believe is novel in the context of linear programming.
Our second result is less crucial, but still useful. It gives a compact formula for the supporting hyperplanes of P U (w) in terms of the Nash equilibrium of a game. Given values a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n ∈ R, let us construct a new table whose (i, j) entry isũ ij = u ij + a i . In other words, we add a i to the entries in the i-th row of U. The new table can be expressed asŨ = U+a·1 T where a is a column vector whose entries are a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n and 1 T is a row vector of all ones. Observe that the tableŨ can be intuitively understood as giving an additional incentive a i to Alice for playing her i-th action (it is actually a disincentive or "tax" if a i < 0). Theorem 3. The set P U (w) can be characterized as follows:
where Nash(U + a1 T ) denotes the value of a two-player zerosum game with payoff table U + a1 T .
In [4] , we give a more complete geometrical picture, by giving a meaning to a → U + a1 T via its convex conjugate dual. This also gives a geometric picture of the Nash equilibrium strategies of Alice.
IV. ON THE MIN-ENTROPY FUNCTION
We begin with a property of the min-entropy function. To state the property, we need the following definition: Definition 4. Consider two games with payoff matrixes U 1 and U 2 . Let U 3 = U 1 ⊕ U 2 be the direct-sum of U 1 and U 2 . Then U 3 defines a new game in which players simultaneously play one instance of U 1 and one instance of U 2 and the resulting payoff is the sum of payoffs from U 1 and U 2 .
Theorem 5. Then, we have F U⊕U (w) = F U (w/2). Similarly, for every natural number k,
An application of the above theorem is that given an expression G U (w) that bounds F U (w) from below for all w and U, we can conclude that
is also a (potentially better) lower bound to F U (w). As a result, we expect that a "good" lower (or upper bound) on F U (w) should have the correct scaling behavior as we simultaneously play more and more copies of the game.
A. Bounds on the min-entropy function
Lower bound: To prove lower bounds for
one idea is to replace the entropy function with a smaller function and compute the minimum over P U (w). Another idea is to also relax the set of distributions P U (w) and replace it with a potentially bigger set. We proceed with the first idea, and comment on the second idea afterwards. Using the fact that the Rényi entropy is decreasing in its order, we obtain that for any α > 1
where H α (p) is the Rényi entropy of order α:
The case α = ∞ results in the following lower bound:
For each i, the problem of finding the maximum of p i over p ∈ P U (w) is a linear program. From Theorem 3, we can find an upper bound on the value of this linear program, yielding
where e i is a vector of length |A| = n whose i-th coordinate is one, and all its other coordinates are zero. The lower bound G (1) U (w), or its relaxed version in (6) can be found in polynomial time, even though they are not in explicit forms.
To obtain explicit lower bounds, observe that log(1/p i ) = d 2 (e i , p), where the vector e i is a probability vector associated to a deterministic random variable that chooses i with probability one. Take some > 0. By definition, deterministic strategies cannot secure a payoff of more than v. Hence e i ∈ P c U (v + ). Thus, 
where (7) follows from Theorem 2. Letting → 0, we obtain
With a similar argument and using the fact that p i = 1 − d 1 (e i , p), for all v ≤ w ≤ w * , we obtain the following lower bound utilizing Theorem 1:
Observe that when v = m, G
When v = m, a simple calculation shows that G
if and only if w ≥ (m + v)/2. We give an explicit example of this in [4] . 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) Remark 6. As shown in [4] , just like that the min-entropy function, we have
have the correct scaling behavior. As discussed in [4] , G (2) U (w) is not piecewise concave or convex in general. On the other hand, G
A sample plot of these lower bounds is depicted in [4] .
Remark 7. Inequality (7) shows that for all w such that v ≤ w ≤ w * and for all i = 1, . . . , n: max p∈PU(w)
which gives an upper bound for the linear programming of max p∈PU(w) p i . Note that P U (w) is a very generic polytope, parameterized by a variable w. By a change of variables (scaling and shifting), one can convert max p∈PU(w) p i to a wide class of linear programs (with no immediate connection to the probability simplex), and then use (8) for it.
Let us now turn to the second idea to prove a lower bound for F U (w) in (4), namely replacing the set of distributions P U (w) with a potentially bigger set. As mention earlier, minimization of the entropy over the set
can be difficult. However, it could be possible to solve it (or find good lower bounds for it) for special choices of the matrix U. 4 We show how a result for an special case of U can be utilized to find a bound (computable in polynomial time) for an arbitrary U. In particular, let us assume that one has a way to minimize entropy over the set Q(r) {p ∈ Δ(A) : p T U * ≥ r T } for some given matrix U * , and any arbitrary column vector r. Then, we are interested in a value for r such that
Then, we can relax minimization of the entropy over the set P U (w) by instead, computing its minimum over the set Q(r).
Note that an appropriate r in (9) can be found by solving a number of linear programs: the product p T U * consists of a number of linear equations on coordinates of p, and the minimum of each linear equation over the set P U (w) is a linear program (see also Theorem 3).
Upper bound: It is clear that any F U (w) ≤ H(p) for any arbitrary choice of p ∈ P U (w). The following theorem gives a number of upper bounds, each of which are obtained by identifying p ∈ P U (w) in different ways. In the extended version [4] , we give a number of explicit bounds for several particular choices of p ∈ P U (w). Theorem 8. Consider a game with payoff matrix U and parameters v, m, m and w * . Let h * be the entropy of some Nash strategy of player A and define Q (1)
U (w) can be defined with any choice of p * max,i from the argmax set (if there are multiple possible choices). Therefore,
Proof of Theorem 8 can be found in [4] .
Example 9. Consider a game with payoff matrix: V. SOME OF THE PROOFS A. Proof of Theorems 1 and 2 Take arbitrary p ∈ P c U (w 2 ) and q ∈ P U (w 1 ). Since p ∈ P c U (w 2 ), when Alice plays according to p, Bob has a (pure) strategy j ∈ B that reduces Alice's expected payoff to a number less than w 2 . We can define a random variableW that represents the payoff of Alice when Alice plays p and Bob plays j. Then, the alphabet set ofW is {u 1j , u 2j , · · · , u nj }, and its probability distribution over this set is p. We must have
Let us assume that Alice adopts q, but Bob keeps playing the same j ∈ B. Let W be the random variable, describing the payoff of Alice when she plays according to q. Because q ∈ P U (w 1 ), E[W ] ≥ w 1 . We can think of W as taking u ij with probability p i . Theorem 1 follows from the following chain of inequalities: 2d 1 (p, q) ) |m − m| 2 . To prove Theorem 2, we use the following lemma. Remember that d 2 (p, q) = log(1 + χ 2 (p, q)). Lemma 10. Take an arbitrary sequence of real numbers (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) and two probability distributions p = (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ) and q = (q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q n ). Let W be a random variable that takes value x i with probability q i , andW be a random variable that takes value x i with probability p i . Then, we have
Furthermore, the above inequality becomes an equality if we set x i = (p i − q i )/q i .
Observe that the left hand side of (10) depends only on the probability values p i and q i , while the right hand side depends not only on the probabilities, but also the values that W and W take. Using this lemma and the fact that E[W ] < w 2 < w 1 ≤ E[W ], we can conclude
Observe that m ≤ W ≤ m holds with probability one. The proof is finished by the following lemma.
Lemma 11. For any w 1 > w 2 , we have
,
The proof of this lemma is given in [4] .
B. Proof of Lemma 10
To the best of our knowledge, the inequality (10) has not appeared in the game theory or information theory literature before. We had a direct proof of it, until we found out that it can be derived from a result of [14] published in a math journal in 2006. According to [14, Lemma 1], we have
Since (11) 
